I was introduced to Alasdair MacIntyre when Ken showed me a MacIntyre quote he had seen. The quote, which is the absolute last thing said in After Virtue, is a bit too long to post here, but the gist is that we are already living in the dark ages, and that we need to construct new forms of community to save our moral and intellectual life. “We are waiting not for a Godot, but for another – doubtless very different – St. Benedict.”
The book is 278 pages of high-brow moral philosophy. There’s an awful lot of stuff in the book, and MacIntyre takes a highly synthetic and historical approach. An example is looking at the social context of emotivism and seeing that “emotivism entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations.” This to my mind is a much better way of addressing the root of the issue than conducting the kind of dry, analytical philosophy (often in the name of objectivity) that is so often conducted today. He of course uses analytical argument when it helps, but this is mainly a book about what virtue used to mean and has come to mean (if anything).
Here’s the run down. MacIntyre posits that the moral language we use has fallen into a state of disorder, and that the prevalent doctrine of emotivism has made all evaluative (and in particular moral) argument rationally interminable. Every emotivist has inherited language the use of which presupposes a kind of objective meaning which is rendered meaningless by emotivism.
The Enlightment project of justifying morality is dealt a coup de grâce by Enten-Eller (similar to the Hilbert program being dealt a coup de grâce by Gödel) Kirkegaardian choice is no more able to replace reason than Kantian reason was able to replace Diderot’s and Hume’s desire and passions as new philosophical underpinnings for the old, inherited ethics. The three competing philosophies each assert the failure of the other two so magnificently that it is realized that all three of them are failures. However, what we should remember (most people don’t) is that, just like Hilbert’s program, the failure of the Enlightenment project was inevitable.
MacIntyre contends that the moral problems of our age are a consequence of the failure of the Enlightenment project, which in turn was doomed to failure because it was a misapplication of logical ideas to the inherited language and morals of classical theism – in particular the Aristotelian tradition.
MacIntyre contends that the most powerful proponents of the modern and premodern interpretations are Nietzsche and Aristotle, respectively. The central thesis which gives power to the Nietzschean position is that all rational vindications of morality manifestly fail. The Aristotelian tradition, and in particular the Aristotelian teleology, were rejected in no small part because of the triumph of the modern thesis that questions regarding the description of man’s telos are essentially unsettlable. Thus, the removal of the conception of the good life for man and the attempt to formulate the inherited ethics without regard for the proper functional definition of man, stripped from the premises of any argument the machinery which could get them to reach the desired conclusions. MacIntyre contends that either we must side with Nietzsche, who brilliantly takes down the Enlightenment project, or we can consider that the project could have never taken place without the rejection of Aristotelian virtue, and that perhaps that rejection should also have never taken place.
Aristotle’s account of the virtues is taken to be not an independent account, but rather an inheritance of the concept of virtue as it was understood going back to heroic society (remember that whole synthetic historical thing?)
MacIntyre then spends a few chapters talking about what he thinks this all means for us, culminating with the quote that Ken showed me.
It’s a pretty good one, and I suppose for a modern reader a lot of it will hinge upon your comfort level with the historical approach (i.e. your ability to accept the proposition that we should cultivate and reawaken tradition).